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AI security MCP server and enforcement gate for Claude Code, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Codex, Replit, and any MCP-compatible editor. Applies OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK, NIST, Zero Trust, PCI DSS, SOC 2, and ISO 27001.

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    Readme

    security-mcp - AI Security Engineer for Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot & Codex

    npm version License: MIT Node.js CI

    Stop shipping vulnerable code.

    security-mcp is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that gives your AI coding assistant the knowledge and tooling of a senior security engineer. Instead of just warning you about vulnerabilities, it writes the secure code - inline, immediately, every time.

    Works with Claude Code, GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Codex, Replit, and any MCP-compatible editor.

    One command to install. Zero security background required.


    Table of Contents


    What's New in 1.1.4

    20 Checks (up from 18) - Deep Injection + Deep Auth Modules

    Two new deep-check modules run automatically for web and API surfaces:

    checkInjectionDeep — 11 new patterns: XXE (CWE-611), SSTI (CWE-94), prototype pollution (CWE-1321), open redirect (CWE-601), NoSQL operator injection (CWE-943), CRLF injection (CWE-113), unsafe YAML load (CWE-502), unsafe deserialization, path traversal (CWE-22), log injection (CWE-117), SSRF (CWE-918).

    checkAuthDeep — 12 new patterns: JWT algorithm confusion / alg:none (CWE-327), session fixation (CWE-384), OAuth missing state parameter (CWE-352), OAuth redirect_uri open redirect (CWE-601), PKCE not enforced (RFC 7636), hardcoded JWT secret (CWE-798), missing rate limit on auth endpoints (CWE-307), plaintext password comparison (CWE-256), SAML signature validation disabled (CWE-347), insecure cookie flags (CWE-1004/614), refresh token not rotated (CWE-613), JWT HS/RS confusion (CVE-2015-9235 pattern).

    Coverage Completeness Protocol (§0)

    Every security review now runs a mandatory 5-step protocol before reporting any result:

    1. Complete file inventory — enumerate all source files into coverage-manifest.json; no attack class can be called CLEAN without checking every file.
    2. Taint tracking — trace every user-controlled input (req.body, req.query, WebSocket, env, file uploads, external API responses) to all downstream sinks, classifying each SAFE / UNSAFE / UNRESOLVED.
    3. Negative assertions — after each attack class: ATTACK CLASS: {name} | FILES: N/N | PATTERNS: {list} | RESULT: CLEAN.
    4. Fix verification loop — after every fix, re-run the triggering check and confirm it no longer fires before advancing.
    5. All-or-nothing mandate — every HIGH/CRITICAL finding is either FIXED (verified clean) or BLOCKED (risk-accepted, gate failing, remediation plan written to deferred-fixes.json).

    Enhanced Threat Model Template

    The security.threat_model tool now generates a more complete template including LINDDUN privacy threat analysis (Linking, Identifying, Non-repudiation, Detecting, Data Disclosure, Unawareness, Non-compliance), TRIKE risk matrix (actor-action-asset-risk), DREAD scoring, attack trees for the top 3 critical paths, adversary profiles mapped to ATT&CK techniques, and supply chain threat enumeration.

    Expanded Release Checklists

    All domain-specific release checklists now include:

    • OAuth/OIDC — PKCE with S256, state/nonce verification, exact-match redirect_uri, code reuse prevention, audience validation
    • Business Logic — idempotency keys on payment mutations, negative input validation, race condition testing for balance/quota/inventory
    • Serialization/Injection — XXE, SSTI, unsafe YAML, deserialization, prototype pollution, open redirect, CRLF in every checklist
    • AI/LLM — system prompt extraction resistance, multi-turn attack chains, multimodal injection, agentic tool allowlist, AML.T0054/T0057 mitigations
    • Payments (PCI DSS 4.0) — PAN masking, DOM mutation monitoring, EMV 3DS 2.2+, Magecart prevention (SRI on checkout pages)
    • Observability Gate (new) — anomaly detection baselines, SLO definitions for security events, alert fatigue review, runbook coverage

    Windsurf Support

    The installer now detects and configures Windsurf (~/.windsurf/mcp.json) automatically alongside Claude Code, Cursor, and VS Code.

    doctor Command

    Verify your installation health at any time:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest doctor

    Checks Node.js version, editor configs, and skill files — prints PASS/FAIL per check with actionable fix commands.


    What Problem Does This Solve?

    When you use an AI coding assistant to build features fast, security is easy to skip - not because you don't care, but because:

    • Security is deep expertise that takes years to develop
    • Most AI assistants write working code but don't enforce secure code
    • Static analysis tools flag problems but don't fix them
    • Hiring a security team or running a pentest is expensive and slow

    security-mcp closes that gap. It integrates a security enforcement layer directly into your AI assistant. Every code change, every PR, every new feature gets reviewed against OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK, NIST, PCI DSS, and 16 other frameworks - and the AI writes the fix immediately.

    The result: You ship faster AND more securely. No security background required.


    Who Is This For?

    • Vibe coders and solo founders building fast who need security to just work without slowing them down
    • Full-stack developers who know their code works but aren't sure if it's safe
    • Startups and small teams shipping web apps, mobile apps, APIs, and SaaS products
    • AI-assisted developers using Claude Code, Copilot, Cursor, or Codex to write most of their code
    • Teams preparing for SOC 2, PCI DSS, or ISO 27001 audits who need evidence and gap analysis
    • Security-conscious engineers who want systematic coverage, not ad-hoc reviews
    • Anyone who's shipped code and thought "wait, is this actually secure?"

    Two Modes - Pick Your Depth

    /senior-security-engineer - Your Daily Security Expert

    A single elite security engineer agent that reviews your code, finds vulnerabilities, and writes the fix immediately. You choose the scope: just your recent changes, your whole codebase, or specific files and folders. It covers secrets, dependencies, cryptography, injection, authentication, web headers, cloud config, AI/LLM safety, mobile, and more - all in parallel. Every finding gets an inline code fix, not a suggestion. Finishes with a SHA-256 attested report you can keep as an audit trail.

    Use this on every PR. Use it before you push. Use it when something feels off.

    /ciso-orchestrator - A Full Security Program in One Command

    39 specialist agents across 3 phases. Phase 1: 7 lead agents run in parallel, each commanding its own team of sub-agents — threat modeling, deep code analysis, cloud infrastructure, supply chain, AI/LLM red team, mobile, and cryptography. Phase 2: adversarial penetration testing and compliance synthesis run in parallel after Phase 1 completes. Phase 3: findings are merged, deduplicated, and attested. Every domain has a dedicated specialist — an injection attacker, a JWT/OAuth hacker, a cloud privilege escalation analyst, a prompt injection specialist, a TLS auditor, a pentest team that reads the threat model as its attack brief, and a compliance analyst mapping every finding to PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, HIPAA, and GDPR. Agents learn from each run and improve over time. 86 specialist skills registered in the registry — loaded on demand based on detected stack. Optionally fetches live CVE, CISA KEV, and ATT&CK data. Produces a merged findings report with full compliance mapping and a signed attestation.

    Use this before major releases, compliance audits, or security reviews. -> See the full 39-agent architecture


    /senior-security-engineer /ciso-orchestrator
    What it is Single expert agent 39-agent multi-phase security program
    Best for Daily development, PR reviews, targeted hardening Pre-launch audits, compliance prep, incident response
    Speed Seconds to minutes Minutes to hours
    Scope You choose: recent changes, full codebase, or specific files Always full - every surface, every framework
    Agents 1 39 (9 leads + 30 sub-agents)
    Output Inline code fixes + SHA-256 attestation Full domain reports + merged findings + attestation
    API cost Low High
    Internet Not required Optional (enriches findings with live CVEs, CISA KEV, MITRE ATT&CK)

    Rule of thumb: Use /senior-security-engineer on every PR. Use /ciso-orchestrator before major releases or compliance deadlines.


    Quick Start - Install in 60 Seconds

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install

    Restart your editor. Then in Claude Code:

    /senior-security-engineer

    That's it. The engineer will ask how you want to scope the review, then find and fix security issues in your code.

    For a full 39-agent deep audit:

    /ciso-orchestrator

    Step-by-Step Installation Guide

    Step-by-Step: Claude Code

    Prerequisite: Node.js 20+ installed. Check with node --version.

    Step 1 - Run the installer:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install --claude-code

    This writes the MCP server config to ~/.claude/settings.json.

    Step 2 - Verify the config was written:

    cat ~/.claude/settings.json

    You should see:

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Step 3 - Restart Claude Code to pick up the new MCP server.

    Step 4 - Verify the tools loaded. In Claude Code, run:

    /mcp

    You should see security-mcp listed as a connected server with security.*, orchestration.*, and repo.* tools available.

    Step 5 - Run your first security review:

    /senior-security-engineer

    The agent will ask:

    • A) Recent changes - scans only what changed since your last commit (fastest, use daily)
    • B) Full codebase - scans everything (use for new projects or after major changes)
    • C) Specific files or folders - scans exactly what you specify

    Pick one and let it run.


    Step-by-Step: Cursor

    Step 1 - Run the installer:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install --cursor

    This writes to ~/.cursor/mcp.json.

    Step 2 - Verify:

    cat ~/.cursor/mcp.json

    Expected output:

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Step 3 - Restart Cursor.

    Step 4 - Open Cursor's MCP panel (Settings -> MCP) and confirm security-mcp shows as connected.

    Step 5 - In the Cursor AI chat, type:

    Use /senior-security-engineer to review my recent changes

    Step-by-Step: VS Code / GitHub Copilot

    Step 1 - Run the installer:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install --vscode

    This writes to your VS Code user settings.json.

    Step 2 - Verify in VS Code:

    Open Command Palette (Cmd+Shift+P / Ctrl+Shift+P) -> Preferences: Open User Settings (JSON).

    You should see:

    {
      "mcp.servers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Step 3 - Restart VS Code.

    Step 4 - In GitHub Copilot Chat, type:

    @security-mcp run /senior-security-engineer on recent changes

    Step-by-Step: Windsurf

    Step 1 - Run the installer:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install

    This auto-detects Windsurf and writes to ~/.windsurf/mcp.json.

    Step 2 - Verify:

    cat ~/.windsurf/mcp.json

    Expected output:

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Step 3 - Restart Windsurf.

    Step 4 - In the Windsurf AI chat, type:

    Use /senior-security-engineer to review my recent changes

    Manual Configuration (Any MCP Editor)

    If the installer doesn't detect your editor, or you prefer to configure manually:

    Step 1 - Print the config snippet:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest config

    Step 2 - Copy the output and paste it into your editor's MCP configuration file.

    Claude Code (~/.claude/settings.json):

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Cursor (~/.cursor/mcp.json):

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    VS Code / GitHub Copilot (settings.json):

    {
      "mcp.servers": {
        "security-mcp": {
          "command": "npx",
          "args": ["-y", "security-mcp@latest", "serve"]
        }
      }
    }

    Windsurf / Codex / Replit - use the same command/args format your editor supports for MCP servers.

    Step 3 - Restart your editor after saving the config.


    Global Install (Optional)

    If you want the security-mcp binary available system-wide without npx:

    npm install -g security-mcp@latest
    security-mcp install-global

    Then you can use:

    security-mcp install-global --claude-code
    security-mcp install-global --cursor
    security-mcp install-global --vscode

    Preview Without Writing Anything

    To see what the installer would do without making any changes:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install --dry-run

    Verify Your Installation

    After installing, confirm everything is wired up correctly:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest doctor

    This checks your Node.js version, editor config files, and installed skills — and prints [PASS] or [FAIL] per check with a fix command if anything is missing.

    Example output:

      [PASS] Node.js 22.x
      [PASS] Claude Code config (~/.claude/settings.json)
      [PASS] senior-security-engineer skill (~/.claude/skills/senior-security-engineer/SKILL.md)
    
    All checks passed. Restart your editor, then type /senior-security-engineer.

    How to Run Your First Security Review

    Daily Workflow: /senior-security-engineer

    Step 1 - Open your project in your editor.

    Step 2 - Invoke the skill:

    /senior-security-engineer

    Step 3 - Choose your scan scope when prompted:

    • Recent changes - scans only files modified since your last commit. Use this on every PR.
    • Full codebase - scans all source files. Use when onboarding a new project.
    • Specific folders - you name the folders. Use when you know the blast radius.

    Step 4 - Watch it work. The agent will:

    1. Call security.start_review to create a tracked run
    2. Build a scan plan covering all relevant OWASP/NIST/ATT&CK controls
    3. Run 20 security checks in parallel across secrets, dependencies, crypto, auth, injection, cloud config, AI/LLM, mobile, and more
    4. Write fixes directly into your code for every finding it can remediate
    5. Generate a SHA-256 attested report at .mcp/reports/{runId}.attestation.json

    Step 5 - Review the output. Each finding shows:

    • What the vulnerability is and why it matters
    • Which attack it enables (mapped to MITRE ATT&CK and CWE)
    • The exact fix that was applied to your code

    Step 6 - Commit with confidence. The attestation file is your audit trail.


    Deep Audit: /ciso-orchestrator

    Use this before a major release, compliance deadline, or security review.

    Step 1 - Invoke:

    /ciso-orchestrator

    Step 2 - Answer the internet permission prompt.

    The orchestrator will ask:

    "I can fetch live CVE data, CISA KEV, and MITRE ATT&CK updates to improve this analysis. Allow internet access for this run? (yes/no)"

    • Yes - agents enrich findings with live threat intelligence. More accurate, more current.
    • No - agents use cached intel. Still comprehensive, no external calls made.

    Step 3 - Wait for Phase 1 (7 lead agents running in parallel, each commanding their domain-specific sub-agents — 25 sub-agents total across Phase 1).

    Each agent writes findings to .mcp/agent-runs/{agentRunId}/.

    Step 4 - Wait for Phase 2 (pentest team + compliance synthesizer).

    The pentest team reads Phase 1's threat model as its attack brief. The compliance agent maps every finding to PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, HIPAA, and GDPR controls.

    Step 5 - Review the merged report.

    The orchestrator presents:

    Agents: 9 leads completed (+ sub-agents)
    Findings: X CRITICAL / X HIGH / X MEDIUM / X LOW
    Remediated inline: X
    Open (need your decision): X
    SKILL.md coverage: XX% (§1-§24)
    Release blocked: yes / no
    Attestation: .mcp/reports/{runId}.attestation.json

    Step 6 - For any open findings, follow the required actions in the report. The agent will help you implement each fix.


    CI/CD Security Gate

    Block insecure code from merging on every pull request - no Claude session required, pure Node.js execution:

    npx -y security-mcp ci:pr-gate

    Add to GitHub Actions

    Create .github/workflows/security-gate.yml:

    name: Security Gate
    
    on:
      pull_request:
        branches: [main, master]
    
    jobs:
      security-gate:
        runs-on: ubuntu-latest
        steps:
          - uses: actions/checkout@v4
            with:
              fetch-depth: 0        # required for git diff to work
    
          - uses: actions/setup-node@v4
            with:
              node-version: '20'
    
          - name: Block insecure code from merging
            run: npx -y security-mcp ci:pr-gate
            env:
              GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

    What the CI Gate Checks

    The gate runs 20 checks in parallel against your diff:

    Category What It Catches
    Secrets Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys (via Gitleaks patterns)
    Dependencies CRITICAL/HIGH CVEs in npm/pip/go/maven packages; CISA KEV cross-check and EPSS >50% auto-escalation via live threat-intel (24h cached)
    Cryptography MD5, SHA-1, DES, RC4, ECB mode, Math.random() for tokens, short JWT secrets
    Authentication Missing rate limiting, no account lockout, JWT alg:none, weak session config
    Injection SQL, NoSQL, command injection, path traversal, SSRF, prototype pollution
    Web headers Missing CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy
    IaC 0.0.0.0/0 firewall rules, public storage buckets, wildcard IAM permissions
    AI/LLM eval() on model output, unvalidated model responses, prompt injection patterns
    Database TLS disabled on connections, raw query concatenation, missing connection encryption
    Mobile android:debuggable=true, cleartext traffic, insecure ATS config
    GraphQL Introspection in production, no depth/complexity limits, batching abuse
    Kubernetes Privileged containers, missing security context, hostPath mounts
    DLP PII in logs, stack traces in API responses, sensitive data in error messages
    Supply chain Missing lockfiles, floating version ranges (^, ~), abandoned packages
    SBOM Generates CycloneDX SBOM for the scanned surface
    Runtime HTTP security headers and TLS config on live staging URL (if configured)
    AI red-team Static + optional dynamic probes against AI endpoints
    Exceptions Validates any active security exceptions are non-expired and properly approved
    Baseline regression Detects when previously-satisfied controls go missing (BASELINE_REGRESSION HIGH finding injected on regression)
    Deep injection XXE, SSTI, prototype pollution, open redirect, NoSQL operator injection, CRLF, unsafe YAML load, deserialization, path traversal, log injection, SSRF (11 new patterns)
    Deep auth JWT algorithm confusion, session fixation, OAuth missing state, OAuth open redirect_uri, PKCE not enforced, hardcoded JWT secret, missing rate limit on auth endpoints, plaintext password compare, SAML signature disabled, insecure cookie flags, refresh token not rotated, JWT HS/RS confusion (12 new patterns)

    Customize the Gate Policy

    Copy the default policy into your project and edit:

    mkdir -p .mcp/policies
    cp node_modules/security-mcp/defaults/security-policy.json .mcp/policies/security-policy.json

    Or generate one tailored to your stack:

    Ask your AI: "Run security.generate_policy with surfaces=[web, api, ai] and cloud=aws"

    Add Exceptions for Known Accepted Risks

    Copy and edit the exceptions file:

    mkdir -p .mcp/exceptions
    cp node_modules/security-mcp/defaults/security-exceptions.json .mcp/exceptions/security-exceptions.json

    Format:

    {
      "version": "1.0.0",
      "exceptions": [
        {
          "id": "EX-001",
          "finding_ids": ["CRYPTO_WEAK_HASH"],
          "justification": "Legacy hash used only for non-security cache keys",
          "ticket": "JIRA-1234",
          "owner": "alice@example.com",
          "approver": "bob@example.com",
          "approval_role": "SecurityLead",
          "expires_on": "2025-12-31"
        }
      ]
    }

    Expired exceptions automatically become CRITICAL findings that block the gate.


    What Gets Fixed Automatically

    When your AI has security-mcp active, it writes the production-ready fix - not a suggestion, not a warning comment:

    Secrets and Credentials

    Insecure Fixed to
    const KEY = "sk-abc123" const KEY = process.env["API_KEY"] + vault reference
    password: "hardcoded" in config Environment variable + secret manager setup
    JWT signed with "secret" RS256 with generated key pair, proper validation
    Bcrypt with cost factor 4 Argon2id with memory: 65536, iterations: 3, parallelism: 4

    Authentication and Authorization

    • Rate limiting middleware added to all auth endpoints (configurable thresholds)
    • Account lockout after N failed attempts with progressive delays
    • Session absolute timeout (8h) and idle timeout (30 min)
    • FIDO2/WebAuthn requirement flagged for admin interfaces
    • IDOR protection: tenant/user IDs read from JWT claims, never from request params

    Injection and Input Validation

    • Zod/Yup schema validation added to every API route handler
    • SQL: string concatenation -> parameterized queries or tagged template literals
    • Command execution: exec(userInput) -> spawnSync with arg array, no shell
    • Path traversal: user-controlled paths validated against project boundary
    • SSRF: server-side HTTP clients get RFC-1918 CIDR block lists + DNS validation

    Web Security Headers

    Before:

    app.get("/", (req, res) => res.send(html));

    After:

    app.use(helmet({
      contentSecurityPolicy: {
        directives: {
          defaultSrc: ["'self'"],
          scriptSrc: ["'self'", (req, res) => `'nonce-${res.locals.nonce}'`],
        }
      },
      hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },
      frameguard: { action: "deny" },
      noSniff: true,
      referrerPolicy: { policy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin" }
    }));

    Cloud Infrastructure

    • cidr_blocks = ["0.0.0.0/0"] -> source-restricted CIDR with comment explaining rationale
    • acl = "public-read" S3 -> Block Public Access enabled at bucket and account level
    • Wildcard IAM "Action": "*" -> least-privilege policy with specific actions
    • Long-lived static credentials -> IAM roles / Workload Identity / OIDC federation

    Cryptography

    • crypto.createHash('md5') -> crypto.createHash('sha256')
    • Math.random() for tokens -> crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex')
    • AES-CBC -> AES-256-GCM with per-message nonce
    • RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 -> RSA-OAEP or ECDH P-256

    AI / LLM Security

    • String-concatenated system prompts -> structured messages array with role separation
    • eval(modelOutput) -> JSON.parse() + Zod schema validation
    • RAG retrieval without auth check -> authorization check before and after retrieval
    • Unvalidated tool calls -> allowlist router that blocks unlisted tool names

    Architecture

    System Overview

    ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
    │                   Your Editor (Claude Code)                   │
    │                                                               │
    │  /senior-security-engineer      /ciso-orchestrator           │
    │  (single expert agent)          (39-agent security program)  │
    │          │                                │                   │
    └──────────┼────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────┘
               │                                │
               └──────────────┬─────────────────┘
                              │  MCP protocol (stdio)
                              ▼
    ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
    │                  MCP Server  (src/mcp/server.ts)             │
    │                                                              │
    │  security.*  tools         orchestration.*  tools           │
    │  ─────────────────         ──────────────────────           │
    │  start_review              create_agent_run                 │
    │  run_pr_gate               update_agent_status              │
    │  threat_model              merge_agent_findings             │
    │  checklist                 ensure_skill                     │
    │  attest_review             read/write_agent_memory          │
    │  get_system_prompt         check_updates / apply_updates    │
    │  scan_strategy             verify_skill_coverage            │
    │  generate_policy                                            │
    │  terraform_blueprint       repo.*  tools                    │
    │  generate_opa_rego         ─────────────                    │
    │  generate_compliance_report  read_file / search             │
    │  notify_webhooks                                            │
    │  generate_remediations                                      │
    └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
               │
               ▼
    ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
    │               Policy Gate Engine  (src/gate/policy.ts)       │
    │                                                              │
    │  20 checks run in parallel:                                  │
    │  checkSecrets    checkDependencies   checkApi    checkInfra  │
    │  checkCrypto     checkMobileIos      checkMobileAndroid      │
    │  checkAi         checkGraphQL        checkKubernetes         │
    │  checkDatabase   checkDlp            checkWebNextjs          │
    │  runSbomChecks   runAiRedteamChecks  runRuntimeChecks        │
    │  checkInjectionDeep (11 patterns)  checkAuthDeep (12 patterns)│
    │                                                              │
    │  Surface detection -> Control catalog -> Exception handling ->  │
    │  Coverage manifest -> Taint map -> Confidence scoring -> PASS / FAIL │
    └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

    /senior-security-engineer Flow

    User: /senior-security-engineer
            │
            ▼
      Claude reads SKILL.md + asks scope choice:
        A) Recent changes (git diff)
        B) Full codebase
        C) Specific files/folders
            │
            ▼  user picks scope
      security.start_review(mode)
        └── creates .mcp/reviews/{runId}.json
            │
            ▼
      security.threat_model(runId, feature)
        └── STRIDE + PASTA + ATT&CK template for changed surface
            │
            ▼
      §0 Coverage Completeness Protocol (runs first)
        ├── enumerate ALL source files → coverage-manifest.json
        ├── taint-trace every user-controlled input → taint-map.json
        ├── negative assertion per attack class: "FILES: N/N | RESULT: CLEAN"
        └── fix verification loop: re-run check after every fix, confirm CLEAN
            │
            ▼
      security.run_pr_gate(runId, mode, targets)
        ├── git diff / glob targets -> changed files list
        ├── detectSurfaces()  ->  web? api? infra? mobile? ai?
        ├── 20 checks in parallel (incl. deep injection + deep auth)
        ├── apply exceptions from .mcp/exceptions/
        ├── compute confidence score
        └── returns PASS/FAIL + findings[]
            │
            ▼
      Claude writes inline fixes for every finding
      (production-ready secure code, not suggestions)
      Every HIGH/CRITICAL: FIXED with verified-clean re-run,
      OR formally blocked with risk-acceptance record
            │
            ▼
      security.attest_review(runId)
        └── .mcp/reports/{runId}.attestation.json
        └── SHA-256 integrity hash

    /ciso-orchestrator Flow (39 Agents)

    User: /ciso-orchestrator
            │
            ▼
      CISO Orchestrator
      ├── orchestration.check_updates()   -> prompt if new version available
      ├── ask internet permission          -> stored for all child agents
      ├── scan project for stack context
      │   (package.json, go.mod, terraform/, .github/workflows/, Dockerfile)
      │   -> stackContext: { languages, frameworks, cloudProvider, hasAI, hasMobile, ... }
      ├── security.start_review()          -> runId
      ├── orchestration.create_agent_run() -> agentRunId + manifest.json
      └── orchestration.ensure_skill(×N)  -> download stack-relevant skills from 86-skill registry
            │
            ▼
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    PHASE 1 - 7 leads + sub-agents  (all parallel)
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    
    Agent 1: threat-modeler
      ├── stride-pasta-analyst        -> STRIDE matrix, PASTA 7 stages, LINDDUN, DREAD
      ├── attack-navigator            -> ATT&CK Navigator layer + D3FEND countermeasures
      ├── business-logic-attacker     -> attack trees per route/flow found in codebase
      └── privacy-flow-analyst        -> GDPR/HIPAA data flows, DPIA trigger check
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/threat-model.json
    
    Agent 2: appsec-code-auditor
      ├── injection-specialist        -> SQL/NoSQL/SSTI/OS cmd/CRLF/log injection
      ├── auth-session-hacker         -> JWT algo confusion, SAML wrap, OAuth confusion
      ├── logic-race-fuzzer           -> race conditions, integer overflow, mass assignment
      └── serialization-memory-attacker -> prototype pollution, ReDoS, zip slip, sandbox escape
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/appsec-findings.json
    
    Agent 3: cloud-infra-specialist
      ├── aws-penetration-tester      -> IAM escalation, S3, Lambda, EKS    (if AWS)
      ├── gcp-penetration-tester      -> SA abuse, GCS, Cloud Run, GKE       (if GCP)
      ├── azure-penetration-tester    -> Managed Identity, AKS, Key Vault    (if Azure)
      └── k8s-container-escaper       -> privileged pods, RBAC escape, hostPath (if K8s)
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/infra-findings.json
    
    Agent 4: supply-chain-devsecops
      ├── dependency-confusion-attacker -> CVEs, CISA KEV, typosquatting, SBOM
      ├── cicd-pipeline-hijacker       -> pull_request_target, mutable Actions, injection
      └── artifact-integrity-analyst   -> SLSA L3, Cosign signatures, provenance
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/supply-chain-findings.json
    
    Agent 5: ai-llm-redteam            (skipped if no AI stack detected)
      ├── prompt-injection-specialist  -> direct + indirect injection, PoC payloads
      ├── model-extraction-attacker    -> API abuse, cost amplification, rate limiting
      ├── rag-poisoning-specialist     -> vector store isolation, metadata filter injection
      └── agentic-loop-exploiter       -> tool blast radius, loop hijacking, allowlist gaps
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/ai-findings.json
    
    Agent 6: mobile-security-specialist (skipped if no mobile detected)
      ├── ios-security-auditor         -> Keychain, ATS, Secure Enclave, Universal Links
      ├── android-penetration-tester   -> manifest hardening, NSC, exported components
      └── mobile-api-network-attacker  -> cert pinning, API key extraction, token storage
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/mobile-findings.json
    
    Agent 7: crypto-pki-specialist
      ├── tls-certificate-auditor      -> TLS 1.3, AEAD ciphers, HSTS preload, OCSP, mTLS
      ├── algorithm-implementation-reviewer -> banned algos, Argon2id params, nonce reuse
      └── key-management-lifecycle-analyst  -> hardcoded keys, rotation, CMEK, post-quantum
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/crypto-findings.json
    
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
         Wait for all Phase 1 agents to complete
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    
    PHASE 2 - adversarial + compliance  (both parallel)
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    
    Agent 8: pentest-team  (reads threat-model.json as attack brief)
      ├── pentest-web-api   -> OWASP Testing Guide on every route found in codebase
      ├── pentest-infra     -> privilege escalation graph, Terraform state, cloud posture
      └── pentest-social    -> OSINT on org, spear-phishing scenarios, insider threat model
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/pentest-report.json
    
    Agent 9: compliance-grc  (reads all Phase 1 findings)
      ├── evidence-collector    -> logging schema verification, SIEM rules, audit trail
      └── compliance-gap-analyst -> PCI DSS 4.0, SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, HIPAA, GDPR
      Output: .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/compliance-report.json
    
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
         Wait for Phase 2 agents to complete
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    
    PHASE 3 - synthesis  (sequential)
    ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
    
      orchestration.merge_agent_findings()  -> deduplicate + sort CRITICAL->LOW
      orchestration.verify_skill_coverage() -> check §1-§24 SKILL.md section coverage
      security.attest_review()              -> SHA-256 attestation written
    
      Final report:
      ├── X CRITICAL / X HIGH / X MEDIUM / X LOW
      ├── Remediated inline: X    Open: X
      ├── SKILL.md section coverage: XX%
      ├── Release blocked: yes / no
      └── .mcp/reports/{runId}.attestation.json

    Agent Memory System

    Every agent persists what it learns so each subsequent run is smarter:

    ~/.security-mcp/agent-memory/{agentName}/
      ├── patterns.json         ← confirmed attack patterns for this tech stack
      ├── false-positives.json  ← findings to deprioritize on next run
      ├── remediations.json     ← what fixes worked for this project
      ├── intel.json            ← cached threat intel (refreshed every 24h)
      └── errors.json           ← tool failure log (used for self-healing)

    Data Written to Your Project

    .mcp/
    ├── reviews/{runId}.json                ← review run state + step tracking
    ├── reports/{runId}.attestation.json    ← SHA-256 auditable attestation
    ├── agent-runs/{agentRunId}/
    │   ├── manifest.json                   ← all agent statuses + current phase
    │   ├── threat-model.json
    │   ├── appsec-findings.json
    │   ├── infra-findings.json
    │   ├── supply-chain-findings.json
    │   ├── ai-findings.json
    │   ├── mobile-findings.json
    │   ├── crypto-findings.json
    │   ├── pentest-report.json
    │   ├── compliance-report.json
    │   ├── sbom.cyclonedx.json
    │   └── merged-findings.json            ← Phase 3 deduplicated, sorted output
    ├── policies/security-policy.json
    └── exceptions/security-exceptions.json

    MCP Tools Reference

    Your AI uses these automatically. You don't call them directly, but understanding what they do helps you know what's happening during a review.

    Core Security Tools

    Tool What It Does
    security.start_review Starts a stateful review run; returns runId used to track all subsequent steps and produce the final attestation
    security.run_pr_gate Runs 20 security checks in parallel; returns PASS/FAIL, findings with severity, and required actions
    security.threat_model Generates a STRIDE + PASTA + ATT&CK threat model template for a specific feature or surface
    security.checklist Returns the pre-release security checklist, optionally filtered by surface (web / api / mobile / ai / infra / payments)
    security.scan_strategy Builds an exhaustive scan plan mapping every check to OWASP, NIST, ATT&CK, and compliance controls
    security.get_system_prompt Returns the full security engineering directive, optionally scoped to your stack and cloud provider
    security.generate_policy Generates a security-policy.json tailored to your active surfaces and cloud provider
    security.terraform_hardening_blueprint Terraform hardening baseline with module layout, guardrails, and control mappings
    security.generate_opa_rego OPA/Rego policy code for Terraform plans, CI pipelines, and Kubernetes admission
    security.generate_compliance_report Maps gate findings to SOC 2, PCI-DSS, ISO 27001, NIST 800-53, HIPAA, or GDPR controls
    security.generate_remediations Maps each finding ID to a concrete code-level fix template
    security.notify_webhooks Sends findings to Slack, Jira, PagerDuty, or any webhook URL
    security.self_heal_loop Proposes adaptive policy improvements based on recurring findings (requires explicit human approval)
    security.attest_review Writes a SHA-256 integrity-hashed attestation file at .mcp/reports/{runId}.attestation.json
    repo.read_file Reads a project file for analysis (path-traversal guarded)
    repo.search Searches the codebase for patterns or regex (ReDoS guarded, max 500 matches)

    Orchestration Tools (/ciso-orchestrator only)

    Tool What It Does
    orchestration.create_agent_run Initialises the 39-agent manifest and .mcp/agent-runs/{id}/ directory
    orchestration.update_agent_status Agents report start/completion; automatically advances phase when all phase agents finish
    orchestration.merge_agent_findings Deduplicates findings from all agents, sorts by severity, writes merged-findings.json
    orchestration.ensure_skill Downloads a skill from the GitHub registry if not cached locally (~/.claude/skills/)
    orchestration.read_agent_memory Loads an agent's prior patterns, false-positives, remediations, and cached intel
    orchestration.write_agent_memory Persists newly learned patterns and remediations after a run
    orchestration.check_updates Checks npm and the skills manifest for newer versions of security-mcp or installed skills
    orchestration.apply_updates Returns update commands (manual) or instructions for the agent to run them (auto)
    orchestration.verify_skill_coverage Reports which SKILL.md sections §1-§24 had zero coverage findings in this run

    Security Frameworks Applied

    All of the following frameworks are applied automatically. You don't need to know them - they're the standards used by the world's top security teams, and security-mcp maps every finding and fix to them:

    Framework What It Covers
    OWASP Top 10 (Web + API) The 10 most critical web and API vulnerability classes
    OWASP ASVS Level 2/3 Application security verification standard - L3 for auth, payments, PII
    OWASP MASVS Mobile application security verification standard
    OWASP Top 10 for LLMs AI-specific vulnerabilities: prompt injection, training data poisoning, etc.
    OWASP Testing Guide Methodology used by pentest sub-agents for endpoint-level testing
    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise + Cloud + Mobile Real attacker playbooks - every finding maps to a technique ID
    MITRE D3FEND Defensive countermeasure mapped to every ATT&CK technique in scope
    MITRE ATLAS Adversarial ML/AI attack techniques
    MITRE CAPEC Attack patterns used at design-time threat modeling
    NIST 800-53 Rev 5 Full US government security control catalog
    NIST CSF 2.0 Govern / Identify / Protect / Detect / Respond / Recover
    NIST 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture - every request authenticated and authorized
    NIST 800-218 (SSDF) Secure Software Development Framework
    NIST AI RMF AI risk management: Map, Measure, Manage, Govern
    PCI DSS 4.0 Payment card industry data security standard
    SOC 2 Type II Trust Services Criteria (Security, Availability, Confidentiality, PI)
    ISO 27001:2022 + 27002 International information security management system
    ISO 42001:2023 AI management system - applied to all LLM/AI components
    GDPR / CCPA / HIPAA Data privacy: consent, retention, breach notification, minimum necessary
    SLSA Level 3 Software supply chain security - hermetic builds, signed provenance
    CIS Benchmarks Level 2 Hardened cloud, OS, and container configurations
    CVSS v4.0 + EPSS Vulnerability scoring and exploit probability - EPSS > 0.5 fixed within 48h

    Configuration

    Customize the Security Policy

    The policy file controls what the gate blocks, what evidence it requires, and how exceptions are handled. Copy the default and edit:

    mkdir -p .mcp/policies
    cp node_modules/security-mcp/defaults/security-policy.json .mcp/policies/security-policy.json

    Key sections:

    {
      "required_checks": {
        "secrets_scan": { "severity_block": ["HIGH", "CRITICAL"] },
        "dependency_scan": { "severity_block": ["CRITICAL"] },
        "sast": { "severity_block": ["CRITICAL"] },
        "iac_scan": { "severity_block": ["HIGH", "CRITICAL"] }
      },
      "vulnerability_slas": {
        "CRITICAL": "24h",
        "HIGH": "7d",
        "MEDIUM": "30d",
        "CISA_KEV": "24h"
      },
      "exceptions": {
        "require_ticket": true,
        "approval_roles": ["SecurityLead", "GRC", "CTO"]
      }
    }

    Add a Security Exception

    When you have a finding you've consciously accepted (e.g., a CVE in a library you're actively replacing):

    mkdir -p .mcp/exceptions
    cp node_modules/security-mcp/defaults/security-exceptions.json .mcp/exceptions/security-exceptions.json

    Edit .mcp/exceptions/security-exceptions.json:

    {
      "version": "1.0.0",
      "exceptions": [
        {
          "id": "EX-001",
          "finding_ids": ["DEP_CVE_CVE-2024-12345"],
          "justification": "Library being replaced in sprint 42; no public exploit yet",
          "ticket": "JIRA-9999",
          "owner": "your-email@company.com",
          "approver": "security-lead@company.com",
          "approval_role": "SecurityLead",
          "expires_on": "2025-06-30"
        }
      ]
    }

    Expired exceptions automatically become SECURITY_EXCEPTION_EXPIRED CRITICAL findings that block the gate until renewed or resolved.


    Environment Variables

    CI / Gate

    Variable Default Purpose
    GITHUB_TOKEN set by Actions Authenticates git operations in CI
    SECURITY_GATE_BASE_REF origin/main Branch to diff against
    SECURITY_GATE_HEAD_REF HEAD Branch being scanned
    SECURITY_GATE_POLICY .mcp/policies/security-policy.json Path to policy file
    SECURITY_GATE_SCANNERS built-in Path to custom scanner config (must be within project directory)
    SECURITY_GATE_EXCEPTIONS .mcp/exceptions/security-exceptions.json Path to exceptions file (must be within project directory)
    SECURITY_GATE_MODE full Set to file_by_file for scoped per-file scanning
    SECURITY_GATE_TARGETS (all changed files) Comma-separated file paths to restrict the scan surface

    Integrations (all optional)

    Variable Purpose
    SECURITY_SLACK_WEBHOOK Sends gate results to a Slack channel
    SECURITY_JIRA_URL Creates Jira tickets for gate failures
    SECURITY_JIRA_TOKEN Jira API token (never logged)
    SECURITY_JIRA_PROJECT Jira project key (default: SECURITY)
    SECURITY_PAGERDUTY_KEY Pages on-call when CRITICAL findings are found
    SECURITY_WEBHOOK_URL POST gate results as JSON to any URL

    Live Scanning (optional)

    Variable Purpose
    SECURITY_STAGING_URL Enables live HTTP header and TLS checks against your staging environment
    SECURITY_AI_ENDPOINT Enables live jailbreak, injection, PII, and rate-limit probes against your AI endpoint
    SECURITY_AUTO_SBOM Set true to auto-generate a CycloneDX SBOM on each gate run

    The 10 Rules That Are Never Broken

    No matter what your AI is asked to build, these are enforced without exception:

    1. No 0.0.0.0/0 firewall rules - ingress and egress must be source-restricted
    2. All internal services over private VPC only - no public IPs for databases, queues, or internal APIs
    3. Secrets in a secret manager only - never in code, .env files, CI logs, or container images
    4. TLS 1.3 for everything in transit - TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are explicitly blocked
    5. Passwords hashed with Argon2id or bcrypt (cost ≥ 14) - MD5 and SHA-1 are forbidden
    6. Every API input validated server-side with a schema - no passing raw request data to business logic
    7. No inline JavaScript - Content Security Policy is nonce-based only; no unsafe-inline or unsafe-eval
    8. Admin interfaces require FIDO2/WebAuthn passkey - TOTP is not acceptable for admin access
    9. Threat model before any auth, payment, or AI feature - no design-free implementation
    10. Zero Trust: every request authenticated and authorized regardless of origin - no implicit network trust

    Troubleshooting

    The /senior-security-engineer command isn't available in my editor

    Cause: The skill was not installed to ~/.claude/skills/.

    Fix: Re-run the installer:

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install

    Then verify the skill exists:

    ls ~/.claude/skills/senior-security-engineer/SKILL.md

    The MCP server doesn't appear as connected

    Cause: Config file was not written, or the editor wasn't restarted after config was written.

    Fix:

    1. Check the config file was written (see editor-specific paths in Manual Configuration)
    2. Fully restart the editor (quit and reopen, not just reload window)
    3. Check Node.js version: node --version - must be 20 or higher

    The CI gate fails with "cannot find module"

    Cause: The dist files weren't included in the npm package, or you're referencing a path that doesn't exist.

    Fix: Use npx -y security-mcp@latest ci:pr-gate which always pulls the latest published version, rather than referencing a local path.

    A finding is a false positive

    Fix: Add it to .mcp/exceptions/security-exceptions.json with a justification, ticket, owner, and expiry date. See Add a Security Exception.

    The gate is too strict for my current project stage

    Fix: Edit .mcp/policies/security-policy.json to lower severity thresholds for your current environment. For example, set dev environment to only block on CRITICAL:

    "environments": {
      "dev": {
        "severity_block": ["CRITICAL"],
        "required_checks": ["secrets_scan"]
      }
    }

    I want to update to the latest version

    npx -y security-mcp@latest install

    This always pulls the latest published version. If you have it globally installed:

    npm install -g security-mcp@latest

    FAQ

    Q: Does this send my code to any external service?

    No. The MCP server runs locally as a Node.js process. Your code never leaves your machine. The only external calls made are to the npm registry (to check for updates) and optionally to GitHub (to download skill files) - both only if explicitly permitted. Live CVE/CISA KEV fetches during /ciso-orchestrator require your explicit internet permission at runtime.

    Q: Do I need to know security to use this?

    No. The tool is designed so that you don't need to understand what OWASP or ATT&CK mean. You describe what you're building, and the security engineer handles the rest.

    Q: Will it slow down my development?

    For daily use with /senior-security-engineer on recent changes, a typical review takes seconds to a few minutes. The fix is inline - you don't need to context-switch to a separate tool.

    Q: What if it fixes something I don't want changed?

    Everything is in your git working tree. Review the diff with git diff, revert anything you disagree with (git checkout -- <file>), and add a security exception if the finding is a false positive or accepted risk.

    Q: Can I use this on an existing codebase with lots of issues?

    Yes. Use security.generate_policy to set appropriate thresholds for your current state, add exceptions for known-accepted technical debt, and use the gate's MEDIUM/LOW findings as a backlog rather than blockers.

    Q: Is this a replacement for a real pentest?

    No - but it covers the same ground and more, continuously, on every change. Use /ciso-orchestrator before major releases to get the depth of a structured security review. For compliance purposes (SOC 2, PCI DSS), the attestation files and compliance reports generated are audit-trail artifacts.

    Q: What AI models does this work with?

    security-mcp is model-agnostic - it's an MCP server, not a model. It works with any AI assistant that supports the MCP protocol: Claude (all models), GitHub Copilot, Cursor, Codex, and others.

    Q: How do I report a vulnerability in security-mcp itself?

    See SECURITY.md for the responsible disclosure policy.


    Contributing

    See CONTRIBUTING.md.

    License

    MIT - security-mcp contributors