Package Exports
- @aldegad/safedeps
- @aldegad/safedeps/bin/safedeps
This package does not declare an exports field, so the exports above have been automatically detected and optimized by JSPM instead. If any package subpath is missing, it is recommended to post an issue to the original package (@aldegad/safedeps) to support the "exports" field. If that is not possible, create a JSPM override to customize the exports field for this package.
Readme
Safedeps
Treat every install as an unconfirmed block —
safedepsapproves the safe ones, reorgs the rest.Pre-approve dependency installs against OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory, enforce the installed closure from Claude Code and Codex CLI hooks, and auto-rollback any install that diverges from the approved closure. (한국어 README → README.ko.md)
Why "reorg"?
In blockchain networks, a reorganization (reorg) invalidates a sequence of blocks and reverts the chain to a previously confirmed safe state. safedeps applies the same principle to your node_modules: every install is treated as an unconfirmed block candidate until it passes a battery of supply-chain security checks. If anything looks wrong, the tool performs a reorg -- rolling back lock files, package.json, and node_modules to the last confirmed safe snapshot.
Fast advisory feedback, observable rollback, and no hidden fallback. The command guard is best-effort UX; the installed effect is the backstop.
Distribution Model
Safedeps has two distribution surfaces:
- Agent skill + hooks (canonical) -- the repo itself is the skill folder.
SKILL.md, hook scripts, provider/ledger libraries, and install helpers stay together in one directory. - npm package (CLI convenience) --
@aldegad/safedepsinstalls thesafedepscommand. npm does not make Claude Code or Codex automatically discover the skill; after npm installation, users still need to run the hook/skill installer or manually register the skill folder.
Use the GitHub release when you want the full skill/hook source tree as the canonical artifact. Use npm when you mainly want a versioned global CLI.
Two Lanes
safedeps owns two security lanes (full design in ARCHITECTURE.md §1):
- Install-time (the focus of this README) — advisory check + approved-spec ledger + fast PreToolUse guard + PostToolUse effect enforcement + post-install reorg. Per-package, around the install command and its actual lockfile effect.
- Release-time —
safedeps gates run,safedeps scan secrets [--repo|--worktree|--staged],safedeps audit npm,safedeps hooks install|check. Repo-tree secret scan, dependency audit, and repo-local git hook install/check before push/release. Repo-specific policy (gitleaks config, privacy paths) stays in the target repo; safedeps owns execution. (Absorbed the formersecurity-release-gates.)
How It Works
safedeps works in two moves around every install:
- Before —
safedeps checkclears a package against OSV (canonical), CISA KEV, and GitHub Advisory, then records the approval in a local ledger. For npm it resolves the package's full dependency closure and checks every transitive package too. - After — the PostToolUse hook re-reads what actually landed in
package-lock.jsonand reorgs (rolls back) anything that isn't in the ledger or that the advisory databases now flag.
The pre-install command hook (PreToolUse) is a fast advisory nudge — it blocks obvious unapproved installs and risky command forms so the agent gets immediate feedback. But for npm the real authority is the post-install effect gate: it judges what was actually installed, not what the command looked like, so a wrapped or obfuscated install command can't slip a package past it.
Script safety (inert install). On Claude Code, the PreToolUse hook rewrites an npm install to add --ignore-scripts, so the install runs inert — packages land on disk but no lifecycle script runs yet. The effect gate then verifies the closure; only if it passes does the PostToolUse hook run npm rebuild to execute the now-verified scripts. A package the gate rejects is reorged before any of its scripts run. (This uses the Claude Code hook updatedInput capability. Codex CLI does not expose it, so on Codex the install runs normally and the effect gate is detect-and-rollback — a malicious install script can run once before the rollback.)
This effect-primary model is npm-only for now. pip, cargo, go, gem, maven, and nuget stay on the v2.1 command-gate + reorg model until their closure resolvers land.
PreToolUse PostToolUse
(safedeps-pre-guard.sh) (safedeps-post-verify.sh)
| |
install cmd ──> [ Advisory/ledger UX ] ──> [ Execute ] ──> [ npm effect gate ]
| | | |
Block obvious Snapshot Clean? Suspicious?
misses/risk lock/manifest files, | |
package listings Confirm REORG
| |
| v v
+--- parent_snapshot_id ──> confirmed
|
Rollback to last
confirmed snapshotPhase 1: Advisory Check (safedeps check)
Before an agent installs a dependency, it should run:
safedeps check <ecosystem> <pkg>@<version|range> --jsonThat command queries OSV (canonical), CISA KEV (hard-risk overlay), and GitHub Advisory (enrichment). For npm, it first creates a script-free temp lockfile with npm install --package-lock-only --ignore-scripts, extracts the full dependency closure, and queries OSV /v1/querybatch. Clean or safely narrowed specs are written to ~/.safedeps/approved-specs/; npm entries also record transitive_specs.
Phase 2: Fast Command Guard + Snapshots (PreToolUse)
When Claude Code or Codex CLI is about to run npm install, pip install, cargo add, go get, gem install, or similar commands, the guard hook provides a fast advisory/UX layer:
- Snapshots the current
package-lock.json,pnpm-lock.yaml,yarn.lock, andpackage.jsoninto~/.safedeps/snapshots/. - Records metadata including a
parent_snapshot_idlinking to the previous confirmed snapshot (forming a chain, just like blocks). - Captures pre-install state of
node_modules(package listings and binary listings) for diff-based detection later. - Fast-checks the approved-spec ledger for explicit
pkg@versioninstall commands. - Runs pre-flight checks and blocks the command entirely if it detects:
- Typosquatting package names (
lod_sh,reacct,axois, etc.) - Non-standard
--registryURLs (anything outsideregistry.npmjs.organdregistry.yarnpkg.com) - Piped remote execution patterns (
curl ... | bash) - Explicit disabling of install script safety (
npm config set ignore-scripts false)
- Typosquatting package names (
If the ledger gate or a pre-flight check fails, the command is blocked before execution -- nothing is installed. This command guard is intentionally best-effort; it improves the agent loop and catches direct misses, while npm authority lives in the post-install effect gate.
Phase 3: Post-install Effect Enforcement (safedeps-post-verify.sh -- PostToolUse)
After the install command completes, the verify hook analyzes what changed. For npm, this is the primary enforcement surface: it reads the actual package-lock.json closure, verifies every package against approved direct entries and their transitive_specs, and re-checks the closure with OSV batch.
npm effect gate -- Reorgs if any lockfile package is unapproved, KEV-blocked, vulnerable, or cannot be verified fail-closed.
Install script analysis -- Scans newly added packages for
preinstall,install, andpostinstallscripts containing:- Network access (
curl,wget,fetch,http,socket,dns) - Dynamic code execution (
eval,exec,spawn,child_process,Function()) - Sensitive path access (
~/.ssh,.env,.aws,credentials) - Obfuscated content (
base64,atob,Buffer.from, hex/unicode escapes)
- Network access (
Lock file diff analysis -- Compares the snapshotted lock file content against the post-install version:
- Resolved URLs pointing to non-standard registries
- Insecure protocols (
http://,git://) in resolved URLs - Unusually large dependency additions (>50 new resolved entries, indicating potential dependency confusion)
Binary inspection -- Checks
node_modules/.bin/for newly added native binaries (ELF, Mach-O, shared objects) that should not appear in a JavaScript project.
Confirm or Reorg
- All checks pass -- The snapshot is marked as confirmed in
~/.safedeps/confirmed. This becomes the new safe baseline. - Any check fails -- A reorg is triggered:
- Lock files are restored from the last confirmed snapshot.
package.jsonis restored if it was modified.node_modulesis rebuilt vianpm ci(ornpm installas fallback) to purge any malicious artifacts.- The event is logged to
~/.safedeps/reorg.log. - Claude Code receives a system message detailing the detected threats and rollback actions.
The Blockchain Analogy
| Blockchain Concept | Safedeps Equivalent |
|---|---|
| Block candidate | Snapshot taken before npm install |
| Block validation | Post-install effect checks (npm closure, scripts, lock diff, binaries) |
| Finality / confirmation | Snapshot ID written to ~/.safedeps/confirmed |
| Chain reorganization | Rollback to last confirmed snapshot + node_modules rebuild |
| Parent hash linking | parent_snapshot_id in each snapshot's _meta.json |
| Chain pruning | Old unconfirmed snapshots cleaned up, confirmed chain preserved |
Detection Rules
| Category | What it catches | Phase | Action |
|---|---|---|---|
| Typosquatting | Known misspelling patterns of popular packages | PreToolUse advisory guard | Block |
| Pipe execution | curl | bash, wget | sh |
PreToolUse advisory guard | Block |
| Registry hijack | --registry pointing to unofficial sources |
PreToolUse advisory guard | Block |
| Script safety bypass | npm config set ignore-scripts false |
PreToolUse advisory guard | Block |
| Command indirection | eval "npm install ...", subshell expansion, variable indirection |
PreToolUse advisory guard | Guard |
| npx/dlx execution | npx, pnpm dlx, yarn dlx package execution |
PreToolUse advisory guard | Guard |
| Unapproved transitive dependency | npm package-lock.json package missing from direct ledger or transitive_specs |
PostToolUse npm primary effect gate | Reorg |
| Vulnerable closure package | npm direct/transitive package with OSV/KEV hit | PostToolUse npm primary effect gate | Reorg |
| Malicious install scripts | Network calls, eval/exec, sensitive path access in hooks |
PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
| Obfuscated code | Base64, hex encoding, Buffer.from in install scripts |
PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
| Lock file tampering | Resolved URLs from non-standard registries | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
| Insecure protocols | http:// or git:// resolved URLs |
PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
| Dependency confusion | >50 new dependencies in a single install | PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
| Native binaries | Compiled executables in node_modules/.bin/ |
PostToolUse effect verify | Reorg |
Installation
Prerequisites
- Claude Code with hook support
jq-- JSON parsing (hooks exit gracefully if missing)shasumorsha256sum-- hash computationfile(optional) -- binary detection
# macOS
brew install jq
# Ubuntu / Debian
sudo apt-get install jqSetup From GitHub (Skill + Hooks)
1. Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/aldegad/safedeps.git
cd safedeps2. Install the skill + hooks:
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjsThe installer is idempotent. It symlinks the skill into ~/.claude/skills/safedeps and ~/.codex/skills/safedeps when those roots exist, patches the matching hook config, and — with --link-bin — can also place safedeps on PATH through ~/.local/bin. That PATH link is optional: the hooks name an absolute fallback path in their block messages, so the gate is self-contained and works with zero PATH setup.
3. Manual hook registration, if needed:
Edit .claude/settings.json (project-level) or ~/.claude/settings.json (global):
{
"hooks": {
"PreToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-pre-guard.sh"
}
]
}
],
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Bash",
"hooks": [
{
"type": "command",
"command": "~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-post-verify.sh"
}
]
}
]
}
}4. Verify permissions:
chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-pre-guard.sh
chmod +x ~/.claude/skills/safedeps/scripts/safedeps-post-verify.shThat's it. The guard activates automatically whenever Claude Code or Codex CLI runs a package install command.
Setup From npm (CLI First)
npm install -g @aldegad/safedeps
safedeps versionnpm puts safedeps on PATH through its standard bin entry. It does not register the agent skill or hooks for Claude Code / Codex. To enable the hooks from the npm-installed copy, run the installer from the installed package root:
cd "$(npm root -g)/@aldegad/safedeps"
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjsThe installer is idempotent and only adds symlinks/hook entries. The --link-bin flag is only useful when you installed via GitHub clone instead of npm — npm already places the CLI on PATH, so the flag is redundant in this path.
If you want the skill folder itself to be the canonical local source, prefer the GitHub setup above.
Daily Re-check With macOS Alerts
Install a per-user LaunchAgent to re-check the approved-spec ledger once per day:
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs install --hour 9 --minute 0This runs safedeps re-check --json against ~/.safedeps/approved-specs/. It does not use LLM tokens; it only calls the advisory providers used by safedeps. If a new CVE/KEV is found, a spec is revoked, or a provider check is skipped, the wrapper writes ~/.safedeps/recheck-alerts.jsonl and raises a macOS notification.
Useful commands:
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs status
node scripts/install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs uninstall
tail -f ~/.safedeps/recheck.logReal-World Attack Coverage
safedeps is designed to catch the patterns behind real supply-chain incidents:
event-stream(2018) -- Maliciouspostinstallscript with obfuscated code that exfiltrated cryptocurrency wallet keys. Caught by: install script analysis (obfuscation + network access detection).ua-parser-jshijack (2021) -- Compromised package added apreinstallscript that downloaded and executed cryptominers. Caught by: install script analysis (network access + code execution).colors/fakersabotage (2022) -- While these were author-initiated, the abnormal dependency behavior would trigger the dependency explosion check.- Typosquatting campaigns -- Ongoing campaigns publishing packages like
crossenv(instead ofcross-env) orbabelcli(instead ofbabel-cli). Caught by: pre-flight typosquatting pattern matching. - Dependency confusion attacks -- Internal package names published to the public registry with higher version numbers. Caught by: non-standard registry detection + large dependency count changes.
Logs and Snapshots
| Path | Description |
|---|---|
~/.safedeps/reorg.log |
Full reorg event history with timestamps, reasons, and rolled-back files |
~/.safedeps/confirmed |
Current confirmed (safe) snapshot ID |
~/.safedeps/snapshots/ |
All snapshot files (lock files, package.json copies, metadata) |
# View reorg history
cat ~/.safedeps/reorg.log
# Check current confirmed snapshot
cat ~/.safedeps/confirmed
# List all snapshots
ls -la ~/.safedeps/snapshots/Old unconfirmed snapshots are automatically pruned (keeping the 10 most recent), while the confirmed snapshot chain is always preserved.
Security Hardening
safedeps includes multiple layers of defense against attacks targeting the guard itself:
| Measure | What it prevents |
|---|---|
| JSON-safe metadata | project_dir is escaped via jq -Rs to prevent JSON injection in snapshot metadata |
| Path canonicalization | realpath/readlink -f resolves symlinks and .. traversal in cwd before use |
| Atomic state files | Snapshot ID and project directory are written as a single JSON file, preventing TOCTOU races |
| Stale lock recovery | Locks older than 60 seconds are automatically removed, preventing permanent DoS from SIGKILL/OOM |
| Project-scoped state | Each project gets its own confirmed snapshot chain (confirmed_${dir_hash}), preventing cross-project interference |
| Restrictive permissions | umask 077 ensures ~/.safedeps/ is readable only by the owner |
| Indirection detection | Commands using eval, $(), or backticks with package manager keywords are treated as install candidates |
Project Structure
safedeps/
bin/
safedeps # CLI -- advisory gate, ledger, revoke, re-check
lib/
providers/ # OSV / CISA KEV / GHSA adapters
ledger/ # approved-spec ledger
scripts/
safedeps-pre-guard.sh # PreToolUse hook -- advisory ledger UX + snapshots
safedeps-post-verify.sh # PostToolUse hook -- npm primary effect verification + reorg
install/install-safedeps-hooks.mjs
install/install-safedeps-recheck-agent.mjs
install/migrate-safedeps-state.mjs
safedeps-recheck-alert.sh
test/
package.json
SKILL.md # Claude Code / Codex skill manifest
LICENSE # Apache-2.0What's Different
safedeps intercepts package installs at the moment an AI coding agent writes the install command — not at CI scan time, PR review time, or runtime sandbox time. That timing is the core differentiator.
Typical flow:
- The agent writes
npm install foo@1.2.3(or any of the other supported install verbs). - The PreToolUse hook does a fast advisory ledger check. If the direct spec is missing, expired, or obviously risky, it blocks the install and returns the exact
safedeps check npm foo@1.2.3command the agent should run next, in the block reason. - The agent runs
safedeps check. The CLI queries OSV / CISA KEV / GitHub Advisory and, if safe, adds the spec to the ledger. KEV matches are hard-block (no override). CVEs with an available patch are auto-narrowed to the fixed version. - The agent retries the install. The ledger entry now matches, so the install proceeds.
- After the install, the PostToolUse hook is the npm primary authority: it verifies the actual lockfile closure against direct ledger entries,
transitive_specs, and OSV batch, then checks install scripts and native binaries and auto-reorgs to the last confirmed snapshot if anything diverged.
Every install command gets fast advisory feedback before it runs; every npm install gets closure-level enforcement after it runs. The suspicious package a human would catch at PR review is already caught at install time — and there is no SaaS dependency, only the local CLI plus public databases (OSV / KEV / GHSA).
Two honest boundaries:
- The command hook is a heuristic, not a sandbox. Unusual wrappers, shell interpreters, or same-user tampering with local
~/.safedepsstate sit outside its trust boundary. The npm effect gate is the backstop — it catches what the command hook misses, because it inspects the installed result rather than the command text. - Effect-primary enforcement is npm-only today.
pip,cargo,go,gem,maven, andnugetstay on the v2.1 command-gate + reorg model until their closure resolvers land.
Legacy / Migration: v1 npm-reorg-guard
The v1 product was named npm-reorg-guard and used ~/.npm-reorg-guard/ as the state directory. v2 moves state to ~/.safedeps/. A one-shot migration is provided:
safedeps migrate- If
~/.npm-reorg-guard/exists, it copies the snapshot chain, confirmed pointers, and logs into~/.safedeps/and archives the legacy directory so there is no second active state root. - If it does not exist, the command is a no-op (fresh v2 users do not need it).