Package Exports

dryinstall
dryinstall/src/loader.js

This package does not declare an exports field, so the exports above have been automatically detected and optimized by JSPM instead. If any package subpath is missing, it is recommended to post an issue to the original package (dryinstall) to support the "exports" field. If that is not possible, create a JSPM override to customize the exports field for this package.

Readme

dryinstall

Zero code executed during install.

A security-focused npm package installer that blocks install-time Remote Code Execution (RCE), detects supply chain attacks across 8 detection layers, and learns your development patterns over time to reduce noise and sharpen warnings.

npm install malicious-pkg
  → postinstall runs → curl attacker.com → ✗ your keys are gone

dryinstall install malicious-pkg
  → 8-layer pipeline → lifecycle blocked → sandbox isolated → ✓ zero code executed

The Problem

Every time you run npm install, you're trusting every package — and every one of its 1500+ dependencies — not to run malicious code on your machine.

Real attacks that already happened:

Package	Year	Attack	Downloads
`event-stream`	2018	postinstall stole Bitcoin wallet keys	2M/week
`ua-parser-js`	2021	maintainer account takeover, malware injected	7M/week
`coa`	2021	same pattern — account takeover	9M/week
`colors` + `faker`	2022	intentional sabotage, infinite loops	20M+/week
`xz-utils`	2024	2-year supply chain compromise via build scripts	Core Linux
`cline-cli`	2026	postinstall silently installed backdoor CLI	Active

The common thread: install-time script execution.

How It Works

dryinstall install <pkg>
         │
         ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│     Pre-Install Checks      │
│                             │
│  ① Confusion Detection      │  scoped pkg on public npm with higher version?
│  ② Hash Verification        │  tarball SHA512 matches registry?
│  ③ Version Diff             │  dangerous patterns added since last version?
│  ④ Stealth Backdoor         │  CI conditionals, time bombs, base64 eval?
│  ⑤ Maintainer Monitor       │  new maintainers? full takeover?
└────────────┬────────────────┘
             │
             ▼
┌────────────────────┐
│  Layer 1: Audit    │  CVE scan
└────────┬───────────┘
         │
         ▼
┌────────────────────┐
│  Layer 2: Lifecycle│  Blocks ALL install-time scripts
│         Block      │  preinstall / postinstall / prepare ...
└────────┬───────────┘
         │
         ▼
┌────────────────────┐
│  Layer 3: Sandbox  │  vm isolation + Worker Thread
│                    │  fs / net / child_process blocked
└────────┬───────────┘
         │
         ▼
    dry_modules/
    (stored, not executed)
         │
         ▼
┌────────────────────┐
│  Adaptive ECU      │  records behavior → learns patterns
│                    │  reduces noise, sharpens warnings
└────────────────────┘

Quick Start

npm install -g dryinstall

dryinstall install express
dryinstall install puppeteer --interactive

dryinstall scan
dryinstall setup-loader

Features

Install-time Protection

dryinstall install <pkg>
dryinstall install <pkg> --interactive

Interactive mode:

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│     [dryinstall:interactive] Lifecycle Script Detected   │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│  Package : puppeteer                                     │
│  Hook    : postinstall                                   │
│  Command : node install.mjs                              │
│  Risk    : LOW                                           │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
  [a] Allow once        [A] Always allow  (saved to .dryinstallrc)
  [b] Block (rec.)      [B] Always block  (saved to .dryinstallrc)
  [v] View source file
  [s] Block all remaining

  Your choice (a/A/b/B/v/s) [auto-block in 15s]:

Risk levels:

HIGH — chained commands (&&, ;), HTTP, sudo, rm -rf, eval
MED — single suspicious pattern
LOW — standard build scripts (tsc, npm run build)

Dependency Confusion Detection

Detects the attack pattern that hit Microsoft, Apple, and Tesla.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│        ⚠  DEPENDENCY CONFUSION DETECTED                  │
│  Package : @mycompany/auth-utils                         │
│  Public  : v9.9.9   ← attacker registered this          │
│  Local   : v1.0.0                                        │
│  Risk    : HIGH                                          │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
✗ Public version is HIGHER — npm would install the attacker's package.

Hash Verification

Validates tarball SHA512 against the registry before installing.

[CRITICAL] INTEGRITY MISMATCH DETECTED
  Package  : express@4.18.2
  Expected : sha512-abc123...
  Actual   : sha512-xyz789...
  → Same version, different content. Package has been tampered.

Version Diff Analysis

Compares JS files between versions. Detects Version Poisoning attacks.

v1.0.1 → v1.0.2

[CRITICAL] child_process execution   (+1 added in lib/index.js)
[HIGH]     network request            (+2 added in lib/utils.js)
→ This may be a Version Poisoning attack.

Stealth Backdoor Detection

Detects code that activates only on CI servers, cloud instances, or specific targets.

Pattern	Severity	Example
CI/CD conditional	CRITICAL	`if(process.env.CI){ require('./steal') }`
Time bomb	CRITICAL	`if(Date.now() >= 1700000000000)`
base64 eval	CRITICAL	`eval(Buffer.from("ZXZpbA==","base64"))`
Env mass collection	CRITICAL	`JSON.stringify(process.env)`
Cloud metadata	CRITICAL	`fetch('http://169.254.169.254/...')`
Hostname targeting	HIGH	`os.hostname().includes("corp")`
Long delay execution	HIGH	`setTimeout(..., 86400000)`
Protestware	HIGH	`while(true){ console.log(...) }`

Maintainer Change Detection

Tracks maintainer history. Detects the ua-parser-js / coa attack pattern.

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│        ⚠  MAINTAINER CHANGE DETECTED                     │
│  Package  : popular-lib                                  │
│  Risk     : CRITICAL                                     │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
  ✗ New maintainers added: attacker-account
  ✗ ALL previous maintainers removed
  → Possible account takeover. Same pattern as ua-parser-js (2021).

Adaptive ECU

dryinstall learns your development patterns over time — like an ECU that adapts to a driver.

dryinstall profile

══════════════════════════════════════════════════
  dryinstall Developer Profile
══════════════════════════════════════════════════
  Tracking since : 2026-03-11
  Total installs : 47
  Project type   : backend
  Version pref   : Stable

  Most used packages:
    express                        12x
    lodash                          8x

  Warning behavior:
    lifecycle       ████████░░  80% ignored   ← noise
    stealth         ██░░░░░░░░  20% ignored   ← paying attention
══════════════════════════════════════════════════

dryinstall config suggest

══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  dryinstall — Adaptive .dryinstallrc Suggestions
══════════════════════════════════════════════════════
  Based on 47 installs since profile creation

  Packages to add to alwaysAllow:
  [1] glob        installed 5x, lifecycle always allowed
  [2] rimraf      installed 4x, lifecycle always allowed

  Apply these suggestions to ~/.dryinstallrc? [Y/n/select]

The more you use dryinstall, the smarter the suggestions become.

Real-World Test: `express`

dryinstall install express

Packages scanned : 2,041
Scripts blocked  : 506
Risky packages   : 370

✓ All lifecycle scripts blocked
✓ Zero code executed during install

Security Levels

Level	Name	Behavior
3	Paranoid (default)	Block all dangerous modules + Worker Thread isolation
2	Balanced	Block `child_process` only, allow `fs`/`net`
1	Relaxed	vm isolation only, no Worker Thread
0	Off	Observe only, no blocking

dryinstall install <pkg> --level=2

Persistent Config: `~/.dryinstallrc`

[A] / [B] in interactive mode saves automatically. dryinstall config suggest populates this from your usage data.

{
  "alwaysAllow": ["glob", "rimraf", "core-js"],
  "alwaysBlock": ["puppeteer"]
}

CLI Reference

dryinstall install <pkg>                          Install through 8-layer security pipeline
dryinstall install <pkg> --interactive            Prompt before each blocked lifecycle script
dryinstall install <pkg> --level=0-3             Set security level (default: 3)
dryinstall install <pkg> --allow=fs,net           Allow specific modules in sandbox
dryinstall install <pkg> --allow-package=a,b      Allow lifecycle for specific packages
dryinstall install <pkg> --allow-maintainer-change  Skip maintainer takeover block
dryinstall install <pkg> --watch                  Enable background process monitoring

dryinstall clean-install                          Remove node_modules and reinstall
dryinstall scan                                   Scan installed node_modules for risks
dryinstall list                                   List packages in dry_modules
dryinstall profile                                Show adaptive developer profile
dryinstall config suggest                         Auto-tune ~/.dryinstallrc from usage data
dryinstall setup-loader                           Register runtime loader in package.json
dryinstall remove-loader                          Remove loader registration

Architecture

dryinstall/
├── src/
│   ├── auditor.js                Layer 1: CVE audit
│   ├── cli.js                    Layer 2: lifecycle blocking + pipeline orchestration
│   ├── sandbox.js                Layer 3: vm isolation + security levels + policy
│   ├── storage.js                dry_modules storage + SHA256 integrity
│   ├── loader.js                 runtime require() hook + bypass patching
│   ├── scanner.js                node_modules scan + isolation
│   ├── dep-graph.js              dependency graph + risk chain analysis
│   ├── network-analyzer.js       install-time network monitoring
│   ├── typo-detector.js          typosquatting detection (top 1000 packages)
│   ├── confusion-detector.js     Dependency Confusion Attack detection
│   ├── hash-verifier.js          tarball SHA512 integrity verification
│   ├── version-diff-analyzer.js  version-to-version dangerous pattern diff
│   ├── stealth-detector.js       CI backdoor, time bomb, obfuscation detection
│   ├── maintainer-monitor.js     maintainer change + account takeover detection
│   ├── profiler.js               developer behavior collection  (ECU sensor)
│   ├── advisor.js                behavior analysis + adaptive guidance  (ECU core)
│   ├── rc-generator.js           .dryinstallrc auto-tuning  (ECU actuator)
│   ├── worker-runner.js          Worker Thread double isolation
│   └── monitor.js                background process + port monitoring
├── bin/
│   ├── dryinstall.js             CLI entry point
│   └── npm-wrapper.js            npm install interceptor
└── dryinstall.policy.json        per-package least-privilege policy

Comparison

Tool	Lifecycle Block	Pre-install	Runtime	Typo	Confusion	Hash	Stealth	Maintainer	Adaptive
`npm audit`	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
`socket.dev`	✗	✗	✗	△	△	✗	△	✗	✗
`LavaMoat`	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
dryinstall	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Known Limitations

Native addons (.node): Cannot be sandboxed at JS level. Requires OS-level isolation.
Dynamic import(): ES module dynamic imports cannot be fully intercepted at the Node.js loader level.
False positives: Standard build scripts are also blocked. Use --allow-package or .dryinstallrc to whitelist known-safe packages.

This is a research-grade prototype. Production use should combine dryinstall with container isolation.

Background

Detection can fail. But if lifecycle scripts cannot execute, the attack surface disappears regardless of what the scripts contain.

Existing tools find known vulnerabilities or sandbox runtime code. None prevent install-time execution. dryinstall targets that gap.

License

MIT

dryinstall

Package Exports

Readme

dryinstall

The Problem

How It Works

Quick Start

Features

Install-time Protection

Dependency Confusion Detection

Hash Verification

Version Diff Analysis

Stealth Backdoor Detection

Maintainer Change Detection

Adaptive ECU

Real-World Test: express

Security Levels

Persistent Config: ~/.dryinstallrc

CLI Reference

Architecture

Comparison

Known Limitations

Background

License

Real-World Test: `express`

Persistent Config: `~/.dryinstallrc`