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Scan ALL Maven, npm, Yarn, Composer, Python, C#/.NET, Go & Ruby dependencies — plus embedded JARs (fat-jars/war/ear) — in a source tree ONE SHOT without mvn/python/etc — CVE (EPSS/KEV-prioritised), EOL, obsolete, outdated & licenses, with SBOM/CSAF/SARIF/JSON exports, CI gating and fix recos

Package Exports

    This package does not declare an exports field, so the exports above have been automatically detected and optimized by JSPM instead. If any package subpath is missing, it is recommended to post an issue to the original package (fad-checker) to support the "exports" field. If that is not possible, create a JSPM override to customize the exports field for this package.

    Readme

    fad-checker

    npm version npm downloads license node

    Fucking Autonomous Dependency Checker

    fad-checker scans Maven, npm, Yarn, Composer (PHP), PyPI (Python), NuGet (C#/.NET), Go, Ruby, vendored JavaScript and committed native binaries in any source tree — multi-module, monorepo, polyglot, whatever you've got — and produces a single self-contained HTML report with CVE (prioritised by EPSS + CISA KEV), EOL, obsolete, outdated and license findings, plus per-ecosystem fix recipes. It also exports a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM and a CSAF 2.0 VEX.

    🌐 Project site & docs →

    fad-checker terminal output — a [n/N] checklist warming each vulnerability database, then CVE findings coloured by severity

    It runs against the source files alone. No mvn, no npm install, no composer install, no pip, no dotnet restore, no Docker. It reads pom.xml, package-lock.json, yarn.lock, pnpm-lock.yaml, composer.lock, poetry.lock/Pipfile.lock/uv.lock/pdm.lock/pyproject.toml/requirements.txt, and packages.lock.json/*.csproj/*.fsproj/*.vbproj/packages.config directly.

    Supported ecosystems: Maven, npm, Yarn (v1 + Berry/v2+), pnpm, Composer, PyPI, NuGet, Go, Ruby + committed native binaries. Each is a self-contained codec (lib/codecs/) — adding another is adding a codec, no orchestrator surgery. Vendored JS (jQuery, Bootstrap, PDF.js, etc.) is also scanned via retire.js. Embedded JARs committed into the tree — vendored libs, Spring-Boot fat-jars, shaded uber-jars inside .jar/.war/.ear — are unzipped in-memory and their Maven coordinates scanned too (disable with --no-jars). Committed native binaries (.dll/.exe/.so/.dylib) are detected (magic-byte confirmed, so images/assets are never picked up) and identified by checksum via deps.dev + CIRCL — to flag tampered/unknown files and libraries that ought to be declared dependencies (disable with --no-binaries).


    Why "Autonomous"?

    Because it doesn't need anything you don't already have on disk:

    You don't need Why
    Maven installed pom.xml files are parsed directly with xml2js. Properties, profiles and local BOMs are resolved in-process. Transitive deps fetched from Maven Central if --transitive (cached forever).
    mvn dependency:tree Same as above. We walk the tree ourselves.
    npm install / a node_modules/ package-lock.json (v1/v2/v3), yarn.lock (v1 + Berry/v2+) and pnpm-lock.yaml (v5/v6/v9) are parsed as text/JSON/YAML. Versions come from the lockfile — no installation.
    yarn install / pnpm install Same. We read yarn.lock (v1 + Berry) and pnpm-lock.yaml directly.
    composer install composer.lock is parsed directly (concrete versions + transitive). composer.json alone → best-effort on pinned versions + warning.
    pip / poetry / a venv poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock, uv.lock, pdm.lock are parsed for concrete versions; pyproject.toml (PEP 621 + poetry) and requirements.txt (following -r/-c includes) are best-effort on exact pins. Names normalised per PEP 503.
    dotnet restore packages.lock.json is parsed; otherwise *.csproj/*.fsproj/*.vbproj (+ Directory.Packages.props Central Package Management) and legacy packages.config, best-effort on pinned versions.
    go build / a Go toolchain go.mod is parsed (the full pruned graph on Go ≥1.17, // indirect → transitive); go.sum is the fallback. No module download.
    bundle install Gemfile.lock is parsed for the resolved gem set. No Ruby, no bundler.
    snyk binary Built-in CVE matching via CVEProject + OSV + NVD (merged), prioritised with EPSS + CISA KEV (see below). Snyk is optional (--snyk).
    A network connection First run downloads CVE / OSV / EOL data; subsequent runs use cached copies (--offline to force).

    Exactly one runtime dependencies must be on PATH (or installed automatically through npm): Node ≥ 20. Everything else is bundled or fetched lazily.


    What it finds

    Chapter Source What it catches
    0. Warnings local heuristics Missing lockfiles, unresolved Maven versions (BOM-managed), private libs not on Maven Central
    1. CVE (production) CVEProject + OSV.dev + NVD + CPE Public CVE / GHSA in production deps, per ecosystem, per manifest file — each row prioritised by CISA KEV + EPSS + CVSS
    1B. Embedded binaries same, on coords read from archives CVEs in libraries shipped inside committed .jar/.war/.ear (vendored libs, Spring-Boot fat-jars, shaded uber-jars) — not declared in any pom.xml. Grouped by containing archive
    1C. Unmanaged / vendored binaries deps.dev + CIRCL (by checksum) Committed native binaries (.dll/.exe/.so/.dylib) no package manager governs — identified by hash, flagged should-be-managed (exists in a registry), name≠checksum (filename disagrees with the hash), unknown (no source knows it) or malicious (free CIRCL signal)
    1D. Unmanaged / vendored JavaScript retire.js (--verbose) Inventory of every standalone JS lib committed into the tree (jQuery, Bootstrap, PDF.js, …) that no package manager governs — vulnerable or not. A cyber-hygiene constat: unknown provenance/integrity/patch story. --no-vendored-js-inventory to skip
    2. Vendored JS (vulnerable) retire.js The subset of the above with known CVEs/advisories — old jQuery/Bootstrap/Angular/PDF.js copies with no lockfile
    3. CVE in dev deps same Same as chapter 1, but for test/provided (Maven) and dev/optional/peer (npm)
    4. EOL frameworks endoflife.date Spring Boot 2.5, Hibernate 4.x, EOL JDKs, AngularJS, Laravel/Symfony, Django, .NET, etc.
    5. Obsolete libraries curated list (Maven) + registry maintainer flags log4j 1.x, jackson-mapper-asl, joda-time, …; npm deprecated, Composer abandoned, PyPI yanked/inactive, NuGet deprecation
    6. Outdated libraries Maven Central + npm / Packagist / PyPI / NuGet registries Available newer versions, with release dates
    7. Licenses (opt-in: --licenses) registry metadata + Maven POMs → SPDX policy Each dep's license normalised to SPDX and classified; copyleft (GPL/AGPL/LGPL/MPL), proprietary and unknown flagged for review
    8. Fix Recommendations computed Per-ecosystem pin recipes: Maven <dependencyManagement>, npm overrides, yarn resolutions, composer require, pip install, dotnet add package

    The HTML report opens in any browser, contains every detail (CVSS vectors, references, full descriptions, CPE configurations, via-paths for transitives) and ships a Word-compatible .doc twin. Every match carries a composite priority (KEV-exploited > EPSS likelihood > CVSS severity), and the run can additionally emit a CycloneDX 1.6 SBOM (--report-sbom, vulnerabilities inline) and a CSAF 2.0 VEX (--report-csaf) for downstream tooling.


    Quick start

    npm install -g fad-checker
    fad-checker -s ./my-project

    That's it. The report lands in ./fad-checker-report/cve-report.html.

    Want a 10× faster NVD enrichment? Get a free NVD API key (instant), then:

    fad-checker --set-nvd-key YOUR_KEY

    Common runs

    # Read-only full scan (default: all sources on)
    fad-checker -s ./proj
    
    # Exclude private/internal libs by groupId/name regex
    fad-checker -s ./proj -e "^(com\.acme|org\.private)\."
    
    # Ignore whole sub-paths during the walk (gitignore-style glob, relative to -s)
    fad-checker -s ./proj --exclude-path "packages/legacy/**" --exclude-path "**/fixtures/**"
    fad-checker -s ./proj --no-default-excludes          # walk everything (incl. node_modules/.git)
    
    # Also write cleaned POMs (private deps stripped, ready for Snyk)
    fad-checker -s ./proj -t ../proj-clean -e "^com\.acme\."
    
    # Then run Snyk on the cleaned tree and merge findings
    fad-checker -s ./proj -t ../proj-clean -e "^com\.acme\." --snyk
    
    # Faster: skip Maven Central / no transitive walk
    fad-checker -s ./proj --no-all-libs --no-transitive
    
    # Fully offline (uses cached data only)
    fad-checker -s ./proj --offline
    
    # License + copyleft-policy chapter (off by default)
    fad-checker -s ./proj --licenses
    
    # Pick ecosystems — --ecosystem is a list: auto (default) | all | comma list
    fad-checker -s ./proj --ecosystem maven            # Maven only
    fad-checker -s ./proj --ecosystem maven,npm,pypi   # several
    fad-checker -s ./proj --no-nuget --no-composer     # or opt out per codec
    fad-checker -s ./proj --no-binaries                # skip the native-binary scan
    
    # Private registry + reusable defaults (see "Configuration file & environment")
    fad-checker --add-repo npm verdaccio https://npm.acme.com/ --token "$NPM_TOKEN"
    fad-checker --config ./ci/fad-env.json             # all options from a JSON file
    fad-checker --source ./proj                        # --source / --src are aliases

    Run fad-checker --help for the full flag list.


    What a report looks like

    fad-checker HTML report — executive summary with severity tiles and a detailed CVE table with CWE, descriptions and fix versions

    The console prints a summary; the full detail lives in the self-contained HTML/.doc:

    ╭───────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
    │ fad-checker v2.2.1 · Autonomous Dependency Checker │
    ╰───────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
    Executive Summary [CRITICAL] — 1708 dependencies scanned
      • 81 CVE in production deps (critical=5, high=53, medium=12, low=11)
      • 32 CVE in dev/test deps · 17 vulnerable vendored JS (retire.js)
      • 2 EOL frameworks · 13 obsolete/deprecated · 172 outdated
      • 4 scan-completeness alerts — see chapter 0

    The HTML report organises this into chapters (0 Warnings, 1 CVE prod, 1B embedded JARs, 1C native binaries, 1D vendored-JS inventory, 2 vendored-JS vulns, 3 dev CVE, 4 EOL, 5 obsolete, 6 outdated, 7 Licenses (opt-in), 8 Fix Recommendations), each grouped by ecosystem and manifest. Every CVE row carries: severity badge · CVE/GHSA id · coord & version · declaring manifest · source(s) · fix-version · priority (KEV/EPSS) — click for the full panel (CVSS vectors, references, transitive paths, CPE configs).


    Install

    As a global CLI

    npm install -g fad-checker

    From source

    git clone <repo-url> fad-checker
    cd fad-checker
    npm install
    node fad-checker.js --help

    Single-binary build (no Node required)

    npm install        # one-time, brings in bun
    npm run build      # → dist/fad-checker-linux + dist/fad-checker.exe

    Shell completion

    fad-checker --completion bash > /etc/bash_completion.d/fad-checker
    # or for zsh:
    fad-checker --completion zsh  > ~/.zsh/completions/_fad-checker

    How it scans without any build tool

    TL;DRfad-checker never runs your build. For each ecosystem it reads the lockfile (or, failing that, the manifest's pinned versions) straight off disk to learn the exact dependency versions, then matches those coordinates against vulnerability/EOL/registry data over the network (cached, --offline-able). No mvn, npm install, pip, dotnet restore, go build or bundle — and no node_modules/.

    Ecosystem Read directly Transitive versions come from
    Maven pom.xml (+ parents, BOMs, profiles) child POMs fetched from Maven Central (cached)
    npm / Yarn / pnpm package-lock.json · yarn.lock (v1+Berry) · pnpm-lock.yaml the lockfile itself
    Composer composer.lock (else composer.json) the lockfile
    PyPI poetry.lock · Pipfile.lock · uv.lock · pdm.lock (else pyproject.toml/requirements.txt) the lockfile
    NuGet packages.lock.json (else *.csproj/packages.config) the lockfile
    Go go.mod (// indirect → transitive; go.sum fallback) the module graph in go.mod
    Ruby Gemfile.lock (specs:) the lockfile
    Vendored JS / binaries the committed .js / .jar / .so files themselves n/a (read in place)

    Highlights of the matching layer: three CVE sources merged (CVEProject + OSV.dev + NVD), CPE/version cross-check to drop false positives, EPSS + CISA KEV prioritisation, lockfile-first with a best-effort pinned-version fallback when no lockfile, in-memory embedded-JAR unzip (no disk, no zip-slip), and checksum identity for native binaries. Outputs: HTML + .doc by default, plus opt-in --report-sbom/-csaf/-json/-sarif; CI gating via --fail-on with --ignore/--vex triage.

    Full per-ecosystem and per-stage detail lives in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md and docs/USAGE.md.


    Caching

    All cached data lives in ~/.fad-checker/ — every source is hit at most once per its TTL (12 h–7 d, transitive POMs forever as they're immutable). Full per-cache TTL table in docs/USAGE.md. Export the lot to share between machines:

    fad-checker --export-cache fad-cache.tar.gz
    # on the other box:
    fad-checker --import-cache fad-cache.tar.gz

    --include-config ships the NVD API key too (off by default).

    The cache export bundles everything under ~/.fad-checker/ (except config.json), including the retire.js findings and the warmed retire.js signature DB — so a machine that imports it can scan vendored JavaScript fully offline.


    Air-gapped / PASSI audits: anonymized dependency descriptor

    When the audited system is offline / confidential (typical of a PASSI engagement) it can't reach OSV / NVD / Maven Central / npm. Split the work across machines while keeping zero environment information off the secure enclave: an anonymized descriptor carries only public package coordinates — no filesystem paths, no registry URLs, no hostnames/usernames — and the detailed report is produced back on the offline machine.

    The transfer relies on a property of fad-checker's caches: they are keyed by coordinate or vuln id, never by path, so they are machine-independent. The online step just warms the caches; the offline step replays the scan and gets cache hits.

    # ── Phase 1 — OFFLINE (audited machine): export the anonymized descriptor ──
    # Exclude private/internal packages with -e (offline we can't tell private from public).
    fad-checker -s ./proj -e "^(client|internal)\." --export-anonymized deps.json
    #   → deps.json: public coordinates only. Review it before it leaves the enclave.
    
    # ── Phase 2 — ONLINE (any machine, no source needed): warm the caches ──
    fad-checker --import-anonymized deps.json     # scans coordinates → OSV/NVD/CVE/registry/EOL + retire signatures
    fad-checker --export-cache fad-cache.tar.gz   # bundle the warmed ~/.fad-checker/
    
    # ── Phase 3 — OFFLINE (audited machine): full report, all local context ──
    fad-checker --import-cache fad-cache.tar.gz
    fad-checker -s ./proj --offline               # re-collect locally (real paths) + cache hits
    #   → full HTML/.doc report with manifests & structure, generated inside the enclave.

    What the descriptor (fad-deps/1) contains vs. drops:

    Kept (needed to scan) Dropped (environment)
    ecosystem, ecosystemType manifest paths / pom paths
    namespace, name resolved registry URLs
    version, versions integrity hashes
    scope, isDev parent chains, lockfile type

    The online phase report is itself path-free; vendored-JavaScript (retire.js) findings are produced offline in phase 3, since retire needs the actual .js files — its signature DB is warmed online (phase 2) and carried by --export-cache.


    Custom repositories & registries

    Register private Nexus / Artifactory / Verdaccio / devpi / GOPROXY registries (for maven, npm, pypi, ruby, go) so transitive resolution, outdated/deprecation and license lookups reach them:

    fad-checker --add-repo maven nexus https://nexus.acme.com/repository/maven-public/ --auth alice:s3cr3t
    fad-checker --add-repo npm   verdaccio https://npm.acme.com/ --token "$NPM_TOKEN"
    fad-checker -s ./proj --repo npm=https://npm.acme.com/        # one-off, repeatable

    Tried in declared order, public registry last; auth via --auth user:pass / --token TOK / inline URL; responses cached per coordinate. NuGet/Composer private feeds aren't supported yet. Full details, the PyPI/Ruby JSON-API caveat and --list-repos/--remove-repodocs/USAGE.md.


    Configuration file & environment

    Don't retype flags every run. Precedence: CLI flag > --config <file.json> / ./.fad-env.json (JSON, keys = camelCase options) > FAD_CHECKER_ENV (a string of CLI flags) > ~/.fad-checker/config.json > defaults. A file/env value only fills an option you didn't pass; registries are merged across every layer.

    fad-checker --config ./ci/fad-env.json
    FAD_CHECKER_ENV='--fail-on high --no-nuget' fad-checker -s ./proj

    -s / --src / --source are aliases. -e/--exclude is a regex on the coordinate (drops deps); --exclude-path is a gitignore-style glob on the path (prunes the walk). Full .fad-env.json schema → docs/USAGE.md.


    Data sources & acknowledgments

    fad-checker is glue around several outstanding public datasets. Each is used per its license terms.

    Source What we use License API / endpoint
    CVEProject cvelistV5 Daily bulk CVE bundle, filtered to Maven-relevant entries CC0-1.0 GitHub release asset (zip)
    OSV.dev (Google + GitHub Security Lab) Per-dep vulnerability lookup (Maven, npm, Packagist, PyPI, NuGet, …) CC-BY 4.0 POST api.osv.dev/v1/querybatch, GET api.osv.dev/v1/vulns/{id}
    NIST NVD Canonical CVE description + CVSS vectors + CPE configurations + CWE US-gov public domain GET services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=… — free API key bumps the rate limit 10×
    FIRST.org EPSS Exploit-prediction score + percentile per CVE CC-BY 4.0 GET api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=… (batched)
    CISA KEV Known-exploited-vulnerability catalogue membership US-gov public domain GET cisa.gov/sites/default/files/feeds/known_exploited_vulnerabilities.json
    endoflife.date Framework / runtime EOL cycle data MIT GET endoflife.date/api/{product}.json
    Maven Central Latest-version lookups + transitive POM fetches Free public service Solr search.maven.org/solrsearch/select?q=… + repo1.maven.org/maven2/<coord>
    npm registry Per-version deprecated + dist-tags.latest Free public service GET registry.npmjs.org/<pkg>
    Packagist Latest stable + abandoned flag Free public service GET packagist.org/packages/<vendor>/<pkg>.json
    PyPI Latest + yanked + "Inactive" classifier Free public service GET pypi.org/pypi/<pkg>/json
    NuGet Latest stable + per-version deprecation Free public service GET api.nuget.org/v3/registration5-gz-semver2/<id>/index.json
    Go module proxy Latest module version (outdated) Free public service GET proxy.golang.org/<module>/@latest
    RubyGems Latest stable + licenses Free public service GET rubygems.org/api/v1/gems/<gem>.json
    deps.dev Native-binary identity by checksum (→ package coordinate) Free public API (CC-BY) GET api.deps.dev/v3/query?hash.type=SHA1&hash.value=<base64>
    CIRCL hashlookup Known-good file identity (NSRL/distro/CDN) + KnownMalicious Free public service GET hashlookup.circl.lu/lookup/sha256/<hash>
    retire.js Vendored-JS signature DB + scanner Apache-2.0 npm package retire, executed locally
    Snyk (optional) Additional CVE source via snyk test --all-projects --json Per Snyk EULA; needs a Snyk account Local CLI snyk
    MITRE CWE Weakness category links in the report Free public reference Linked by URL only, no API call

    Persistent caches mean each source is hit at most once per its TTL (see Caching table). No telemetry, no third-party analytics — every request listed above is made directly to the named endpoint with a User-Agent: fad-checker-* header.


    Safety rails

    Built-in guardrails that fire before any disk write:

    • --target is required unless you're running read-only (no -t).
    • --target may not equal or be a subdirectory of --src.
    • --target is rimraf'd before being rewritten — never point it at anything precious.

    Comparison

    fad-checker is not a Trivy/Grype competitor — those are container-and-SBOM supply-chain scanners. It targets a narrower job: a zero-setup, multi-ecosystem audit of a source checkout, with an audit-ready report and a confidential / air-gapped workflow — the kind of thing a security consultant or an ANSSI-PASSI engagement needs.

    fad-checker OSV-Scanner Trivy Grype + Syft OWASP DC Snyk OSS
    Ecosystems it targets¹ Maven, npm, Yarn, pnpm, Composer, PyPI, NuGet, Go, Ruby + vendored JS + native binaries 11+ langs / 19+ lockfiles 20+ 20+ Java/.NET (others exp.) many
    Reads lockfiles without install/build ⚠️ Java needs Maven Central/build ❌ build required
    Best-effort when no lockfile (pinned versions) ⚠️ ⚠️
    Vulnerability sources CVEProject + OSV + NVD + EPSS + KEV + retire.js (+ Snyk), merged OSV.dev Aqua DB Anchore DB NVD / CPE Snyk DB
    False-positive control CPE/version cross-check ecosystem-aware ecosystem-aware ecosystem-aware ⚠️ CPE → noisy ecosystem-aware
    EOL (end-of-life) detection ✅ endoflife.date ~
    Outdated / deprecated ✅ registries + curated ~
    Containers / OS packages
    SBOM (CycloneDX/SPDX) ✅ CycloneDX 1.6 (+ CSAF 2.0 VEX) ✅ (Syft) ~
    License compliance ✅ SPDX + copyleft policy ~ ~
    EPSS / KEV prioritization ✅ FIRST.org EPSS + CISA KEV ~
    CI gating (--fail-on) + triage ✅ severity/KEV + ignore/VEX ⚠️
    Auto-remediation / PRs ❌ (fix recipes only) fix
    Offline ✅ cache ✅ local DB ✅ feed ❌ mostly online
    Scan without exposing the codebase² ✅ anonymized descriptor
    Maven private-dep cleanup (→ Snyk)
    Output HTML + Word .doc + JSON / SARIF / CycloneDX / CSAF table/JSON/SARIF table/JSON/SARIF table/JSON/SARIF HTML/XML/JSON JSON / cloud UI

    ¹ Narrower language coverage — no Rust/Dart/Swift (Go and Ruby are now covered).

    ² Phase 1 exports only public coordinates; the online scan never sees your source tree — see Air-gapped / PASSI. OSV-Scanner has an offline mode, but it still needs the source on the scanning machine.

    Where it fits: a one-shot audit of a polyglot checkout you may not be able to build, a presentable HTML/Word deliverable, and confidential / air-gapped engagements.

    Where it doesn't: container/OS scanning, reachability analysis, auto-fix PRs — reach for Trivy or Grype + Syft.

    You don't have to choose — fad-checker takes Snyk's results as input (--snyk) and merges them.

    Sources: OSV-Scanner lockfiles · Trivy Java/pom.xml (Maven Central, --offline-scan) · Syft java-pom-cataloger (source dirs) · OWASP DC needs internet/build for Java · Snyk requires building the project · EOL/outdated "most tools skip" (Aikido)


    Docs


    License

    MIT — see LICENSE.